Done! 
http://modernityandthehui.wordpress.com
Sorry for the lateness, no excuses to give here. I even marked the reading throughly though but never got around to write about it.
Sachiko Murata’s treatment of Wang Tai-yu’s Great Learning compares it to Chinese Neo-Confucianism and (earlier) version of the Great Learning. In this process, Wang is validating the Neo-Confucian tradition yet criticizing it for failing to see the ultimate “God in himself”, as well as the “Numerical One”, the first principle of his creation. I found it interesting that some scholars suggest that the concept of transcendence is alien to China – it’s a powerful idea but I can see why this idea is being thrown around. Murata argues that the Chinese Muslims did see transcendence in both Buddhism, Taoism and Neo-Confucianism, but that they were not emphasized enough. Yet, the term transcendence (and immanence) itself is problematic as Murata claims there are no equivalents at all in both Chinese and Islamic (and by extension, Chinese Muslim!) traditions. Murata claims that Islamic thought puts God as utterly inaccessible, and described by the word “Real” by Wang and other Islamic thinkers. How does this differ from transcendence? Transcendence is ultimate and surely inaccessible as well. The distinction between the Real One and the Numerical One was also rather confusing and would require further reading, even though Wang did provide a plethora of synonyms for the Numerical One…
Despite the heavy, often difficult theological nature of the work, allusions to other traditions were simple and very easy to understand, such as the criticism of Confucian relationships because they are often flawed. I could also relate this a bit to Plato’s Republic, where the problem of knowing what the real “metal” of every human being was. The Tao and yin-yang were invoked as modes of showing difficult ways to realizing the “Real Lord”, but with a definitive end in sight.
No offense to Chinese academic writing, but Wang Tai-Yu’s violent condemnations of the Confucians the Taoists was… almost Taoist in character. Having read Chuang Tzu, the man jumps rapidly from point to point, ridiculing, and questioning assumptions about a particular tradition. Such questioning is almost nonexistent in late Western philosophy and religion; these tend to be more treatises. Perhaps this is due to the volatile role Islam played in China; as a minority religion often repressed by authorities it needed to establish a role by establishing itself as unique from other traditions (while also admitting their good aspects as to not alienate them).
However, it is not truly fair to just problematizes Wang’s treatise and his simultaneous borrowing from, and scathing insult of Buddhism, Taoism, and to a lesser extent, Neo-Confucianism. In my Intro to Christianity class textbook (and in the lectures as well) I was intrigued about how the idea of general thematic consistency came up. Theorists have argued that despite numerous doctrinal differences that arose, early Christians were surprisingly likeminded when it came to the fundamentals. I find this easier to believe considering that the Catholic and Orthodox churches tried numerous times to reintegrate until the Turks sacked Constantinople. Going back on topic, to what extent has Islam remained “consistent” despite borrowing terms from other traditions such as Neo-Confucianism?
While doing research on my final project I could assess how Islam is able to both borrow from other cultures and beliefs while maintaining its core beliefs. Ben Hillman describes how a largely secular, small rural Hui village surrounded by multiple ethnicities that interacted very closely became strongly religious and separate from other ethnic groups in the area. Such rapid growth of religious power in such a rural, hybrid area is surprising to say the least. Perhaps the rapid Islamicization of Balong village was due to the PRC’s minzu paradigm where the Hui were directly linked to Islam. Certainly, repeating the same success of Islam (or any other religion for that matter) would be a lot harder in counties like Canada. The point is that after Islamicization, the village did not completely abandon ties to non-Islamic entities. The village constantly appeased the CCP and worked within their discourses. They did not fully ostracize intermarried Muslims. When a visiting Ahong offended a more secular local leader, the Ahong was recalled even though he was more popular and powerful. Islam is thus not wholly compatible, nor wholly friendly towards other elements, like Tai-yu’s treatise.
I wasn’t able to think of too much to say on Islamic Calligraphy in China, but considering I did a small project on Islamic Calligraphy earlier I easily recognized the different styles (Kufic, Thuluth, etc). I find it odd that the author chose not to explore how China got to develop a separate form, even though the author did say that the judges at the Fourth International Calligraphy and Calligraphic Art Exhibition and Competition couldn’t judge Chinese calligraphy at all because they had no experience with it.
Apparently there were many calligraphers who had no idea what they were writing, especially when writing in high places in antiquated Kufic – chances are nobody would look and even if they did they wouldn’t be able to tell what was written there anyway. I wonder to what extent that was applicable to the Chinese, considering access to Arabic would have been limited in many cases.
This multientry project will focus on exploring Hui urban life and how it is influenced by notions of modernity and traditionality. Important questions to be explored include whether the concept of being Hui can be conclusively tied with traditionality as opposed to Han modernity according to the discourse prevalent in PRC sanctioned academia. If not, what exactly are the factors that shape Hui identity?
Keep updated on more updates here:
http://modernityandthehui.wordpress.com
Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak’s chapter Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in Flux is quite a concise, well-written article that doesn’t veer off from its main message which seems to be that the modern Uyghur identity is a multifactoral, multicentric one with an equally complex history. Yet, the fact is that this identity is not esoteric, with distinct patterns following Uyghur reaction to foreign and internal entities (i.e. governmental policy and action). What struck me as odd is how lacking in consistency the PRC was, and still is in policies concerning the Uyghur. Rudelson and Jankowiak do provide several reasons behind radical changes, but yet it is quite obvious that much of the decisions were random, yet expensive “tests” based on mass ignorance. Considering how modern Chinese for the most part simply tend to forget the past (i.e. neither vilifying nor praising Mao), the Uyghur seem to have carried past sufferings at the hands of the Han. Even though this seems rather obvious, it was a rather illuminating point in the article. Perhaps like the “Free Tibet” movement that only gained much popularity recently after Tibet had been conquered for decades, minority rights in far-off countries have been deprived of historical basis. The Han can forget the past because they were as a group the creator of the PRC, yet the Uyghurs cannot because they were only changed by the Han. They did not fully change with them, and conflict still continues.
The section on how revisionist Uyghur have tried to reconstruct a linear, ancestral history by claiming the Caucasian Xinjiang mummies as their ancestors. Perhaps this ties in with what was discussed in class about some Uyghurs borrowing from Nazi rhetoric? In many ways this is proof that despite the Uyghur trying to maintain their own identity, they ultimately have to play the same game the PRC is doing – namely of rigid ethnic definitions. The same thing is true for education, whereby Uyghur children need to blend into Mandarin, Han education in order to be successful enough to build their own strong identities.
The biggest complaint with the article was in its superficial, often puzzling treatment on the HIV/AIDS problem. Is there no Uyghur movements trying to stop the spread? Why has the government not reacted? How exactly do redevelopment projects strengthen vectors that exacerbate the spread of HIV/AIDS? I would think that the opposite would be true, considering redevelopment would be tailored to combat this problem rather than simply let it remain within the redeveloped areas. It is too simplistic to answer these questions with silence. Why are these questions not asked not answered? In the later article, Gladney makes an apt point about how Uyghurs seem frustrated by the back of publicity for their cause compared to movements by groups such as the Falun Gong and Tibetans, but in that case he is dealing with foreign coverage, which is a lot different from internal coverage. Surely the PRC should know that leaving the situation as is would neither help relations with Islamic countries, nor global opinion.
It was rather difficult to understand Gladney’s article on Cyber Separatism since no excerpt was provided from any of them. It would be helpful to actually visit them later on. However, things that caught my attention was how Gladney explored how their audience was specific, though often influential in International affairs. A brief exploration of how the Tibetans and the Falun Gong managed to get into mass media might be relevant here.
Anyhow, Gladney explores the extent to which states (China, USA) change their policies to cater to their goals. For instance, China sends less religiously inclined students for exchange because it does not challenge their secular, Han-centric goals while at the same time bettering relations with Islamic nations. In a more negative light, definitions of terrorism seem to depend almost wholly on the USA – it was only with their appeals that the ETIM was declared terrorist instead of the numerous other violent Uyghur groups. Perhaps the reason the Tibetans and the Falun Gong have received such global support is because they influenced the USA – certainly the Dalai Lama (and Tibetan Buddhism) has enjoyed much publicity as of late especially amongst the intelligentsia, and the Falun Gong have numerous communities in the USA.
The Chapters on education were rather straightforward, though a little suprising in some facts (i.e. more Hui in primary schools than Han, despite having a lower college enrollment rate). Much of this was covered by Gillette (i.e. Hui claiming lower cultural quality based on official education only). More will be said on this topic in an upcoming project!
This has got to be the most interesting article I’ve read so far on Chinese Muslims for its ability to combine both academic studies and conclusions with real Hui people who are often quoted word for word with even the original Chinese provided alongside the translation. The article’s scope also went far beyond the usual conclusion of Hui being considered a ethnoreligious group; Gillette explores their modes of settlement, economy, diet and modern trends in ways that show that these often ignored categories are real players in affecting what it means to be a Hui. Religion may be a special concept but there’s no doubt that it is intimately connected to the people who practice it. In this regard, her choice of first jumping right into the milieu of the Hui Quarter (Huiminfang) without giving any introductory theory is a very welcoming approach that just promises to be taken advantage almost as if the reader is invited to be a tourist:
“Most of the quarter’s shops and eateries were small-scale family enterprises.” (22)
“Family enterprise was an extension of the family living quarters.” (23)
“…tended to live clustered together.” “…’around the mosque’…” (30)
The Google streetview presents a bustling, overwhelmingly crowded little quarter, full of business of life yet largely cut off from Han modes of planning and construction, business, and education.
Later we move deeper, interacting with its people and hearing their opinions:
“the Hui that I talked to were in favor of urban renewal.”
“No one seemed worried about the fate of the mosques, the possible break-up of the community into temporary housing for a year or longer, or the likelihood that residents would be unable to the Muslim district.” ( 60)
Of course, the surprise is that the Hui of the quarter overwhelmingly dislike the area. Considering they built most of it in a way that would be conveniant to their practices (including Islamic practices) one would expect a more sympathetic response. Yet, the concessions the Hui have to make due to redeveopment seem irrelevant compared to the benefits of modernization. The question must be asked, to what extent do the mundane life patterns of the Hui play a role in affirming their identity as Muslims? They certainly don’t seem to mind adopting methods that would temporarily disrupt their religious life. How exactly would the new apartment buildings fulfill the role the courtyard played?
Later, food (and cleanliness) is discussed as an area in which Hui generally claim superiority to the Han. If their cleanliness so surpasses that of the Han, how is it that their quarters are, as the Hui themselves admit, so disorderly? Gillette doesn’t give an answer in this regard, but it could very well be because of a reason often provided by the Hui themselves for their “backwardness”; the Hui do not see themselves as inferior, but limited due to opressive intervention by the PRC. Though it’s obviously not the whole picture, the way the Hui shaped their beliefs to establish a strong narrative is quite interesting, and very telling about their aspirations vs. reality.
I found it rather interesting that whereas a Hui restaurant can earn around $2100 a month (keep in mind that the GDP of China during this time was only a quarter of what is now, and would be about $750 in a year per capita) the secretary of the History Department at the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences only makes $40 a month! True enough, the amount is split among seven members, but that still amounts to almost ten times the difference! The GDP/capita of the family would be $3100 – quite an amazing amount. This gives a very good picture of how the Hui were so quickly able to mobilize and “upgrade” their stores before the government moved to compensate them (for the redevelopment project).
Sorry about yet another late entry. A lot of things have been going on that’s made my amazing 3 course workload a LOT harder than it’s supposed to be…
Anyhow, this week I’m going to be taking a look at sections of Michael Dillon’s
- China’s Muslim Hui Community
, an outline of these distinct people from a historical, and later Sufi religious perspective.
First, it is interesting to observe how interconnected scholarship on Chinese Muslims are. Donald Lesie and Dru Gladney are revisited, with their influence being quite obvious as well. For instance, Dillon does a initial exploration of the hardships involved in defining who actually qualifies as a Hui; Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank explored this issue quite well when in the context of the PRC, with the existance of “underground” churches as well as non-documented Muslims. Gladney likewise calls the numbers of Chinese muslims “unknown”. Indeed, it appears that almost the entirity of the important themes in the first section, “Ethnicity and Hui History” is firmly embedded in what other scholars already did while outlining the history of the Hui. I’ll point out some interesting “repeat” themes before moving into more new ones.
Prominent themes include:
* The rise of the term Uyghur, as well as the similarly recent revival of the term Hui, as covered by Gladney
* The definition of Hui as governed by the more concentrated, Northern Hui instead of those scattered in major cities (not always the case as we shall see later)
* The blurring of the boundry between culture and “religion”, and how this infringed on Hui life (or in many cases, was avoided by Hui adaptibility)
* The modern willingness of many different Muslim groups petitioning to be called as Hui (modern Hui unity strengthened by the PRC minzu paradigm)
* The vague history of the Hui in the pre-Mongol period, with the term Hui itself being heavily contested
* The vagueness of Hui ancestors, though some groups (i.e. Persians) seem prominent
* The important middle-man (as well as warrior and artisan) role the Hui played in the Muslim period and how it both empowered and alienated them
* The Ming era where Hui largely became deeply entrenched into Chinese society, intermarriage, rise of Islamic academia, technology, ideas, popularization of Sufism
* Cities as centres of Hui culture
* Little records of Hui commoners
The chapters on Chinese Muslim Sufiism proved more interesting if VERY heavy material, as although Leslie did cover these Sufi groups it was only to a small degree. I found it interesting how Sufism, often stereotyped as “liberal” had such stringement requirements after membership, and how the Gedimu was considered more conservative than the Wahabbi Yihewani. As well, the extent to which Gedimu was the only real contender is quite astonishing, considering that the period of “Chinese Muslims” in the Ming dynasty started before that.
The final chapter on language also gave much insight, with the Hui adopting from, and often being fluent in Arabic and Persian being quite a surprise. The Persian element was especially surprising, considering its attachment only to local forms of Islam, not a concrete aspect like the Qur’an. Also, not all Muslims shun imagery, thank you Mr. Dillon!
Oh, and I happen to be the only person from my group to have posted so far. I feel less bad 
:D:D
The interesting thing about reading about Xinjiang (“new territory”) is that like its name, there is a giant void in public knowledge about the area. Indeed, there is a giant void in public understanding of all Chinese Muslims. It wouldn’t be too surprising to see simplistic people who readily limit Islam as something limited to the Middle East (or terror) pause in confusion upon realizing that there are Muslims in China at all.
Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank make a fascinating point that even the most comprehensive of traditional scholarship about religion and modernity effectively ignores thecomplex interactions between the modern state and the modern concept of religion. As modern scholarship was defined by modernity, the modern (and incorrect) concept of religion being in direct opposition to the modern, secular state was formed. However, definitions of both religion and state are fluid, and thus can never be truly separate. Seeing how Ashiwa and Wank totally debase such an entrenched notion while trying to understand the Muslims of China brings to mind the benefits of studying minorities, especially those that have been defined by greater powers.
Perhaps it is the very lack of scholarship and public attention to Chinese Muslims that foster more comprehensive theories. With so little knowledge of these people, scholars of Chinese Muslims almost always seem to provide historical overviews that stress not a linear history but a plethora of complex interactions between numerous entities.
In this regard Milward and Perdue’s article gives much insight into how complex the history of Chinese Muslims are. I find it especially interesting how the people of the region have been treated in shockingly different ways through the whims of nomadic warlords and Han imperial armies, not to mention how whole people have been displaced, replaced, and returned to the same geographical area. Indeed, even groups of people have changed – modern Uyghurs are neither ethnically, culturally, or religiously same as the Uyghurs of the past.
Lipman provides a more analytical (and helpful) approach that is a good example of what Said calls the “clash of definitions” – although the PRC always had an interest in its minorities as sources of unrest (a discourse of violence pervades most written work about Chinese Muslims) the methods, as well as the extent to which it attempted to define Chinese Muslims changed greatly over time.
What is tragic about all this is that Lipman’s, as well as Milward and Purdue’s article merely seems to explain what is happening with Chinese Muslims, especially those in Xinjiang. It is rather ironic that despite this solid explanation of the complexity and fluidity of religion and ethnic identity, the reality is that there is mass misunderstanding of Chinese Muslims, especially those that do not integrate into the Han political hegemony as is the case with the Uyghurs. Indeed, this may just well be the exemplification of the PRC discourse that sees minzu and “Chinese” geography as having been always there as constant historical facts.
Check out:
Lipman, Jonathan. “Introduction”, “Frontier Ground and Peoples of Northwest China” Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997
Millward, James and Peter C. Perdue. “Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century” Xinjiang: China’s Muslim BorderlandLondon: M.E Sharpe, 2004
